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Introduction
The role of government in assuring population access
to affordable and appropriate health care represents
a central question for any nation. Of particular concern is access to prescription drug coverage, not only
because of the vital role played by drugs in modern
medicine, but also because of their high costs. This
article examines the sharply contrasting prescription
drug coverage and payment policies found in Australia
and the U.S. – strong political allies and international
trading partners – and describes how key U.S. interests
have sought, through an aggressive trade agenda, to
expand markets for U.S. goods and services, even when
market expansions clash with other nations’ contrasting emphasis on social equity and fairness. Indeed, the
nation’s bilateral free trade negotiations have brought
the contours of this policy schism into sharp relief.
We begin with an overview of Australia’s approach
to prescription drug coverage. We then examine U.S.
policy, and in particular, its policy approach under
Medicare, the nation’s only universal health care
financing system. We also provide a summary table
of key features, which can be found at the end of this
article. In examining Medicare prescription drug coverage policy, we pay special attention to two aspects of
policy design: (1) beneficiaries’ right to choose among
plans and (2) the right to challenge the benefit design
(that is, the design of drug plan formularies). Both of
these policy devices touch deep chords in U.S. society
regarding notions of fundamental fairness; the question is whether, compared to the Australian system,
these two legal dimensions of the U.S. system create
fairness that is more illusory than real.
We conclude with a brief discussion of the ways
in which the U.S. vision of the role of government in
advancing markets, along with its desire to safeguard
its own industries, has resonated in bilateral trade
agreements, and briefly consider the resulting impacts
on the Australian system.

The Australian Approach to Prescription
Drug Coverage: The Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme (PBS)
Australians have benefited from comprehensive outpatient prescription drug coverage for over 50 years.
In establishing the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
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(PBS) following the end of World War II, Australia signaled affordable access to essential prescription medicines as a national health policy priority. The objective of the PBS is to “to provide timely access to the
medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals
and the community can afford.”1 As a key component
of a broader, single payer, health insurance system, the
program reimburses community pharmacists for the
costs of dispensing outpatient prescription medicines
that are prescribed in accordance with a comprehensive formulary, or “positive list.”
At its inception, the PBS offered free access to every
drug in the British Pharmacopoeia for pensioners,
and 139 “life-saving and disease-preventing” drugs for
everyone else.2 Since that time, the PBS has evolved
into a formulary of more than 2,500 different items
covering most medical conditions for which drug

For many years, the addition of new drugs to the
PBS formulary was based primarily on a consideration of clinical need. In the late 1980s, however, the
Australian Government took the unprecedented step
of introducing an explicit consideration of “value for
money” as a prerequisite for formulary listing. The
economic evaluation requirement is not, as is often
claimed, intended primarily as a mechanism of cost
containment, but rather as a means of ensuring that
the addition of each new drug to the formulary represents reasonable value for money for Australian
taxpayers.5
Although Australia was the first country to introduce economic evaluation to support decision-making
for its national formulary, pharmacoeconomic evaluation to inform drug reimbursement and coverage decisions is used in Canada (originally at provincial level

One of the effects of the reference pricing system is that the prices of drugs
may be linked irrespective of patent status. Although the pharmaceutical
industry perceives this is as undermining the value of the patent, from the
payer’s perspective, however, it may be argued that it is neither rational nor
efficient to pay more for a drug just because it is patented if it confers no
additional health benefit, than a drug whose patent has expired and is cheaper.
therapy is appropriate. The program covers all Australian residents who are citizens, as well as visitors and
temporary residents from countries with which Australia has reciprocal health care agreements.3 Funded
through federal taxation revenue, the PBS is essentially a demand-driven program with an uncapped
appropriation. Beneficiaries do not pay premiums, but
contribute to the costs of their medicines through flat
co-payments set at two levels determined by income.
Importantly, the co-payment does not vary with the
cost of a drug, and caps on annual out-of-pocket
expenditures protect against catastrophic costs.
Consideration of whether, and under what conditions, a drug should be subsidized is the responsibility
of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
(PBAC). The PBAC is a statutory independent expert
committee established under the National Health
Act 1953 to make recommendations to the Minister
for Health and Ageing on which medicines should be
included on the PBS formulary, and any listing conditions that should apply. The legislation makes clear
that the PBAC is the “gatekeeper” to the formulary;
though the Minister is the final decision-maker, he
may not add a drug to the formulary unless he has first
received a positive recommendation from the PBAC.4
644

in British Columbia and Ontario and later centrally
through the Common Drug Review), in the U.K. by the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE), and the Scottish Medicines Consortium, and
to varying degrees in a number of European countries
including France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.6 This
form of evaluation is sometimes referred to as a “fourth
hurdle,” reflecting the additional obstacle to be overcome by a drug company (over and above the requirement to demonstrate safety, efficacy, and quality for
marketing approval) before funding of a new product
within a public program. Although it is applied to only
a very limited extent within U.S. federal programs, it
is reportedly used by a number of large private insurers and managed care organizations.7 Recently, there
has also been growing interest in the establishment of
a mechanism for the centralized evaluation of comparative effectiveness in the U.S., as a way to support a
more value-based health care system.8
Pharmaceutical companies seeking to add a drug to
the PBS formulary must present a detailed submission
according to a comprehensive set of guidelines, which
describe how to identify, collate, and present the necessary clinical and economic evidence.9 Under the legislation, the PBAC may only recommend the listing of a
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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medicine after an explicit consideration of evidence of
its comparative clinical effectiveness and cost relative
to alternatives (which may be drug or non-drug therapies).10 Where a drug is substantially more costly than
available alternatives, it may only be listed if it offers, for
some patients at least, a clinical advantage.11 Put simply,
this means that unless a new drug offers an additional
clinical benefit over an appropriate comparator, it may
be added to the formulary, but cannot receive a higher
price for subsidy purposes. A drug listed on this basis
is subject to reference pricing – that is, it is linked by a
“therapeutic relativity” to its comparator, either joining
an existing reference pricing group or forming a new
one. The price the government pays for any drug in a
reference group is then set by the lowest price (known
as the benchmark), which has been secured for any
drug in the group. One of the effects of the reference
pricing system is that the prices of drugs may be linked
irrespective of patent status. Although the pharmaceutical industry perceives this is as undermining the value
of the patent, from the payer’s perspective, however, it
may be argued that it is neither rational nor efficient
to pay more for a drug just because it is patented if it
confers no additional health benefit, than a drug whose
patent has expired and is cheaper.
Where a sponsor presents evidence that a new
drug offers a clinical advantage over its comparator,
the additional benefits are weighed against the additional costs in a cost-effectiveness or (preferably) a
cost-utility analysis, and a determination is made as
to whether the drug is acceptably cost effective at the
price proposed by the drug’s sponsor. In this respect,
the PBS operates as a therapeutic-value based pricing
system: it may be thought of as “purchasing outcomes”
rather than drugs.
If a drug is not considered acceptably cost effective,
then the sponsor may make a resubmission in which
it could (1) present further evidence of incremental
benefit over the comparator; (2) offer a reduction in
the proposed price; or (3) try to identify an indication
or patient population in which the drug is more cost
effective. As a result, a drug may be listed on the PBS
but with its subsidized use limited to certain indications, patient groups, or clinical settings in which
it is determined to be both clinically and cost effective.12 Cost effectiveness is context dependent, and a
drug may be acceptably cost effective when used for
one indication or patient group, but not cost effective
when used in other circumstances.
While the deliberations of the PBAC are held in
camera, detailed information on the committee’s recommendations and reasoning are made public after
each meeting. Importantly, decision-making is at
population level, and the PBS processes provide no
global health law, ethics, and policy • winter 2007

mechanism for considering individual circumstances
or accommodating individual needs and preferences,
or for allowing an individual to challenge a coverage
decision that he believes may affect him adversely. If
a patient does not meet the listed criteria for subsidy,
then there is no mechanism to consider an exception.
The only mechanism for reconsidering a coverage
decision is at the level of the decision to add a drug to
the formulary.
As the PBS accounts for around 80 percent of prescriptions dispensed in Australia, and more than 90
percent of those dispensed in the community,13 the
government wields significant monopsony power, and
medicines which are not listed on the PBS generally
have a limited market. To the pharmaceutical industry,
the PBS processes are seen as a mechanism for price
suppression.14 This has been reinforced by studies that
have highlighted, at times inappropriately, differences
in pharmaceutical prices between Australia and other
OECD countries, particularly the U.S.,15 but without
taking sufficient account of the benefits of an assured
market with a high penetration of patented products.16
Price comparisons are not straightforward and depend
on a range of factors including treatment patterns and
the basket of drugs compared. Comparisons with the
U.S. are the most compelling but also the most likely
to mislead. Prices paid for PBS–listed medicines are
publicly available, but those paid by major third-party
payers in the U.S. are not. In fact, some evidence suggests that for drugs that represent significant advances
in therapy – true therapeutic innovations – the prices
paid in Australia are as high as in the U.S., and sometimes even higher, for biologics, in particular.17
Australians have an expectation that prescription
medicines will be both accessible and affordable. In
terms of its reach and impact, the PBS has been successful in ensuring that all residents have access to a
comprehensive range of prescription medicines drugs
at prices that are affordable not only to individuals, but
also to the government and the community as a whole.

The U.S. Approach to Prescription Drug
Coverage: The Case of Medicare
In contrast to Australia, the U.S. has no national
mechanism for ensuring prescription drug coverage
for the population. As with other essential health care
services (other than, perhaps, hospital care to screen
and stabilize emergency medical conditions), the U.S.
approach to health care is market based, meaning that,
by and large, health care is dealt with as a commodity. Of course, affordability is a recognized barrier, but
no national financing mechanism exists to make health
care affordable to the population. Instead, health insurance for the under-65 population is a voluntarily con645
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ferred dimension of employee compensation.18 The federal and state governments jointly operate Medicaid, an
essential public financing scheme for certain indigent
populations such as low-income children, pregnant
women, impoverished elderly, and disabled persons.19
Only in the case of elderly persons and certain persons with disabilities does the U.S., through Medicare,
offer universal coverage and financing. Not until 2003,
nearly 40 years after prescription drug coverage was
first recommended, and 15 years after an initial Medicare prescription drug law was enacted and quickly
repealed,20 did Congress add outpatient prescription
drug benefits through enactment of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
(known as Medicare Modernization [MMA]).21
The MMA added a new section, Part D, to Medicare, which had previously consisted of three parts: A
(hospital insurance), B (supplemental medical insurance), and C (offering various forms of private health
insurance coverage as a Medicare coverage option and
renamed Medicare Advantage as part of the MMA).
Although Part D is a complex law, it can basically be
summarized as follows: the legislation entitles individuals who qualify for Medicare Parts A and B coverage
to voluntary, subsidized enrollment in a participating,
commercially sponsored prescription drug plan. Prescription drug plans are sold in decentralized, federally defined regional markets, and the public enrollment subsidy is adjusted by family income, with low
income Medicare beneficiaries fully subsidized for
covered benefits.
Under the standard benefit, Part D enrollees are
entitled to covered plan benefits following satisfaction
of an initial plan deductible. Initially, covered benefits
are payable at a 75 percent rate up to an expenditure
threshold; at this point, enrollees fall into what is
known as a “doughnut hole” and must incur thousands
of dollars in direct financial obligation for uncovered
costs until they reach a second, catastrophic threshold.
At this point, plan coverage resumes, with payment for
95 percent of the recognized costs of covered benefits.
The value of both the subsidy and the doughnut hole
are pegged to an annual inflation rate, which means
that the costs beneficiaries must incur continue to
rise with time, along with the program’s financial protections. Low-income Medicare beneficiaries receive
additional help through a special “low income subsidy” program, but this assistance phases out at 150
percent of the U.S. federal poverty level and contains
strict asset and complex enrollment requirements.
Prior to 2003, no Medicare prescription drug market existed. Thus, in order to create a market for outpatient prescription drug coverage, the law incentivizes companies in several ways: indirectly, by creating a
646

pool of “customers” who can afford their products, and
directly through generous payments, “stop loss” protections against the risks of entering the market, and wide
latitude within broad statutory rules to design their
products. Thus, the U.S. has chosen to use its resources
to stimulate a market both directly and indirectly.
The tortured structure of the legislation – and the
high level of financial exposure enrollees continue to
face – are the result of its design. Because the law relies
exclusively on a heavily subsidized commercial market
willed into being by the legislation, the nation must
pay for private services including enrollment, coverage
design, price negotiation and payment, program operations, and bill payment. Furthermore, because these
tasks are the purview of market suppliers, data on their
operations are considered proprietary and thus enjoy
considerable public shield. Under these circumstances
(as well as the right to exit the market whenever conditions go south), it comes as little surprise that a robust
prescription drug market quickly emerged.22
Part D plans come in two basic forms. Some offer
coverage only for prescription drugs and are known as
prescription drug plans (PDPs). Others are Medicare
Advantage plans that offer coverage for all Medicare
benefits (i.e., A, B, and D coverage) for a comprehensive
fixed monthly premium and are known as Medicare
Advantage – Prescription Drug Plans (MA-PD plans).
The existence of multiple providers was intended
to support a key objective of Part D: to deliver a high
degree of choice for beneficiaries. In some respects,
it may be argued that in providing choice, Part D has
been unexpectedly successful: the number of “standalone” prescription drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare
Advantage plans with prescription drug coverage
(MA-PDs) exceeds predictions.23 The federal investment is estimated at $395 billion over ten years.24
Because Medicare Part D involves federal governmental financing for voluntary private health insurance, the cost of the coverage is high in relation to the
benefits conferred. One prominent U.S. economist
has estimated, for example, that citizens of France, the
U.K., and Canada pay 34 to 59 percent of what it costs
Americans for the same prescription drug market
basket.25 Had Part D legislation mirrored Medicare’s
initial design structure – that is, had the law relied
on direct government financing for covered services
at publicly negotiated rates – the coverage lapse confronting beneficiaries with high health needs (i.e.,
the doughnut hole) might have been substantially
eliminated. However, because eliminating the doughnut hole would have lowered the price of prescription drugs by an estimated 45 percent (along with
creating direct government control),26 the approach
was politically unthinkable. (As it was, nearly superjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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human political effort was required to pass any govtion, each pharmacologic class is made up of a number
ernment-financed prescription drug coverage scheme
of formulary key drug types (FKDTs), and plans must
under Medicare, reflecting overwhelming industry
cover at least one drug in each FKDT.
resistance to any role for government
in prescription drug financing and the
memory on the part of many lawmakIn view of the highly risk-averse nature of the
ers of the Medicare prescription drug
insurance industry, decision-makers concluded
debacle of 1988.)27 Indeed, so closely
that only relatively robust federal regulation
did the 2003 battle resemble the politics surrounding the passage of the
could avert the complete avoidance of certain
original 1965 Medicare statute, that,
beneficiaries and conditions through the use of
as with the 1965 law, the 2003 legisexclusionary design principles. But as each layer
lation famously contains a statutory
non-interference clause prohibiting
of design regulation is added, the ability
the Secretary of Health and Human
to negotiate deep discounts is weakened.
Services from engaging in direct price
negotiation.28 (The 1965 non-interference clause prohibited interference in
the practice of medicine; overt statutory prohibition
Although “free market competition” and “choice”
against interfering in price negotiations was unnecare words commonly used in describing Part D, the
essary since the original legislation was structured to
rules established by CMS on participating drug plans
effectively pay physicians what they charged.)29
impose not inconsiderable constraints, with the result
Medicare PDPs and MA-PD plans compete over a
that the benefit more closely reflects a regulated
range of plan characteristics; in theory at least, plans
industry than an unfettered, market-driven program.
use this competition to drive drug price discounts.
For example, the degree of granularity of both the
Enrollees may choose among plans offering different
pharmacologic classes and the FKDTs has increased
premiums, formularies, number of cost-sharing tiers,
with each of the three iterations of the Model Guidedegrees of cost sharing, utilization management tools
lines to date. For those subclasses containing only a
and extent, if any, of gap coverage. In 2007, the numsingle drug, plans that wish to comply with the Model
ber of PDP choices ranges from 45 in Alaska to 66 in
Guidelines have no choice but to add the drug to the
Pennsylvania and West Virginia; even greater numformulary – irrespective of the clinical place of the
bers of MA-PD plans are available in each region, with
drug, the therapeutic benefit it confers, or the cost of
nearly 4,000 across the country.30 So complex is the
its acquisition – and thus have little or no leverage in
choice that both the government and private organizathe price negotiation. Regulatory constraints tend to
tions have created online tools that allow both enrollsupport the multiple-tiered benefit design that most
ment (in the case of the government) and comparison
providers have opted for. Some plans have as many
shopping by price and coverage characteristics.31
as eight tiers, but most have three or four, with coParticipating plans have a degree of autonomy in
payments increasing with each subsequent tier, and
constructing their coverage design, which is presumed
higher tiers typically requiring enrollees to contribute
to operate on the basis of a formulary (as would any
a 25 or 33 percent co-insurance amount rather than a
modern drug coverage scheme). The law specifies that
fixed co-payment. In addition, providers have considif a participating provider uses a formulary, it must
erable autonomy in the application of utilization manappoint a Pharmacy and Therapeutics committee to
agement tools: prior authorization, quantity limits,
develop and review the formulary according to Model
and step therapy requirements.
Guidelines developed by the U.S. Pharmacopoeia
In sum, the theoretical long-term financial advan(USP).32 Moreover, if the formulary conforms to the
tages to be gained by stimulating robust market develModel Guidelines, then the Centers for Medicare &
opment and entry through very high payments at the
Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that overoutset have been blunted by the realities of this parsees the Medicare program, must approve it. The USP
ticular type of market, which focuses on vulnerable
Model Guidelines require each formulary to include
populations, and a pharmaceutical industry with surat least two drugs within each pharmacologic class
passing political power. The extent of the federal cov(as defined by USP) of covered Part D drugs, except
erage design standards ultimately included in the law
for the so-called protected classes, for which the plans
are in part a testament to an industry whose overarchmust cover “all or substantially all” drugs.33 In addiing goal was to ensure the strongest possible strategic
global health law, ethics, and policy • winter 2007
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position in relation to a heavily subsidized Medicare
market. At the same time, the regulatory standards
underscore the inherent asymmetry of information in
U.S. health care purchasing, especially when the product to be purchased is as complex as prescription drug
coverage, and the consumers are elderly and disabled.
Even the most intrepid Medicare beneficiaries would
have difficulty navigating the plan choice comparison
gauntlet (either the paper or online version). Furthermore, more than a quarter of all beneficiaries are
estimated to have a degree of cognitive impairment.34
Thus, the goal of a truly competitive purchasing environment has had to give way to market realities and
concerns. These concerns are, of course, not irrational.
In view of the highly risk-averse nature of the insurance industry, decision-makers concluded that only
relatively robust federal regulation could avert the
complete avoidance of certain beneficiaries and conditions through the use of exclusionary design principles.35 But as each layer of design regulation is added,
the ability to negotiate deep discounts is weakened.
Of course, it would have been unimaginable for Congress and the President to say to Americans, “We are
paying a king’s ransom to get private companies to do
what we could do for you for half the price and more
coverage.” Therefore, in the tradition of any political
undertaking whose goal is to make a major change
attractive to politicians and the general population
alike, lawmakers stressed not only the additional benefits (and indeed, prescription drug coverage has grown
significantly since the law was enacted, from a quarter
of seniors aged 65 or older without any form of drug
coverage in 2003 to over 90 percent of the 44 million
Medicare beneficiaries covered in 2007),36 but also the
fact that the benefits would be consistent with American values: the right to choose and the right to all medically necessary care recommended by a physician.
Choice is a value that ostensibly permeates American society and culture, although the extent to which
this emphasis on choice is a reflection of efforts on the
part of the market to insist that people want choice
above all, cannot be known. Studies of choice suggest,
in fact, that having too many choices creates both confusion and inefficiency.37 Therefore, whether people
would have traded a degree of choice for the simplicity and stability of traditional Medicare – especially
had they understood how the program would work
and had been told that they could get a good deal of
more coverage through an approach that mirrored
traditional Medicare – cannot be known. Since government administered coverage and pricing could not
possibly have been enacted given the politics of the
White House and Congress in 2003, such a dialogue
would have been moot.
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Americans’ belief in the right (at least among affluent
and insured persons) to all medically necessary care is
so pervasive that most policymakers appear to consider
it a policy canon that the electorate simply will not
tolerate a public, transparent discussion concerning
the tradeoff between ensuring decent coverage for all
persons, and allowing some individuals to have access
to virtually everything that is available, even as others have virtually nothing. (A version of this was tried
in the U.S. in Oregon in 1993, when then-Governor
John Kitzhaber held a series of statewide discussions
about rationing. In that case, however, the only individuals who were asked to give up coverage to aid the
uninsured were the state’s poorest Medicaid-enrolled
women and children).38 This inability to have a public
discussion about national health policy choices in modern society was a strong undercurrent in the collapse of
the Clinton health reform plan, and generally reflects
a broader failure on the part of American society to be
able to grapple with the notion of a collective, public
decision to curb individual freedoms in the name of a
social good. So ingrained is this individualism aspect
of the American psyche that the policymaking process,
ever eager to succeed politically, simply concludes that
individual freedom is an essential dimension of any
broad policy solution, regardless of need or topic.
The Medicare prescription drug legislation tips its
hat to the American psyche not only through its provisions guaranteeing a choice of plans, but also through
the coverage appeals process. In American law, it is a
generally accepted aspect of fair process that insured
individuals should have a means of challenging a
denial of payment for a covered benefit on medical
necessity grounds.39 But what is not legally accepted
is the notion that Americans should have the right to
challenge the design of the coverage itself.40 Indeed,
where privately sponsored or purchased coverage and
Medicaid are concerned, challenges to coverage design
are dismissed as being without legal remedy, in deference to the discretion of payers in determining what
will be covered.
Medicare is profoundly different. Since 1999, the
law has allowed beneficiaries to challenge coverage
determinations under the traditional program. Medicare coverage determinations, like Australia’s PBS
listing recommendations, consist of a structured technical and deliberative assessment of the evidentiary
appropriateness of altering Medicare coverage design
by recognizing a new technology or procedure. Part
D follows suit, permitting enrollees to challenge not
only the denial of a covered benefit, but also the design
of coverage itself. This right to challenge populationwide design limits included in any particular Part D
plan is accomplished through a special appeals procejournal of law, medicine & ethics
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dure known as the “exceptions” process. The process
covers not only tiering design, but also the presence,
in either a general or a particular form, of a specific
drug on the formulary.41 As one might imagine, support for an exceptions process is politically strong; but
even if public-coverage determinations were open to
individual challenges, how would it be possible not to
allow coverage-design challenges when the decisionmaker is a private company?
In truth, however, the Part D exceptions process is
structured so as to create a nearly conclusive presumption against design modification. The regulations that
establish the exception process grant nearly total discretion to plans by providing that a plan “must” grant
an exception “whenever it determines that the drug
is medically necessary consistent with the physician’s
[submission of proof ].”42 However, within Medicare’s
broad medical necessity standard,43 the plan’s precise
medical necessity protocol, and the evidence that it
may consider, are left entirely to the plan – hence, the
legal legerdemain (the plan “must” grant the exception
whenever the plan concludes, totally without regulatory encumbrance, that the exception is necessary).
As if a nearly unfettered grant of discussion were not
sufficient, the regulations also impose a heavy evidentiary burden on requesting physicians and patients.
Under the exceptions rules, plans are empowered to
require physicians to provide supporting documentation demonstrating: the ineffectiveness of the drug
on the formulary tier; or the likelihood of ineffectiveness “based on both sound clinical evidence and
medical and scientific evidence and the known relevant physical or mental characteristics of the enrollee
and known characteristics of the drug regimen; or
an actual or likely adverse reaction “based on sound
clinical evidence and medical and scientific evidence;”
or the drug’s ineffectiveness or potential for adverse
impact based on “sound clinical evidence and medical
and scientific evidence and the known relevant physical or mental characteristics of the enrollee.”44 In other
words, clinical judgment alone does not suffice; in the
absence of scientific evidence the rule is constructed
so as to allow the plan to deny the request, even when
there is no scientific evidence to be had.
This legal allocation of the burden of proof in relation to the design of a formulary runs contrary to the
expectation that the burden should fall on the entity
with preferred knowledge position (in this case, the
plan itself, which presumably would know why a
drug was either wholly excluded or limited to restrictive terms of coverage). Furthermore, many physicians would find meeting this burden of proof challenging in all but a few clinical circumstances. Other
than excluding the use of a particular drug because of
global health law, ethics, and policy • winter 2007

documented prior subjective treatment failure, previous or predictable adverse reactions on the part of the
patient, or known drug-drug interaction, physicians
would find that the necessary evidence regarding the
effects of alternative drugs may be scarce, particularly
so in the case of newer drugs. And if it is difficult for
physicians to meet the evidentiary standard, then
clearly it is impossible for enrollees.
Federal public reporting requirements are so limited that the number of requested and granted exceptions is not known. One legal commentator who has
written extensively on Medicare appeals procedures
has reported that enrollees and those acting on their
behalf have encountered significant problems both in
requesting exceptions and in pursuing other coverage
determinations and prosecuting appeals.45
In sum, while the architects of Part D have highlighted the unalloyed benefits of freedom of choice for
Part D enrollees and have developed a paper system for
challenging design limits, the reality is quite different.
Many important characteristics of the program are
involuntary, inequitable, and highly opaque. Enrollees
are required to choose their plan on the basis of premiums, drug price, and prescription regimens at the
time that the law’s annual enrolment window is open.
Not only does this have the effect of institutionalizing
risk selection, but an objectively sensible and rational
choice of plan can prove to be a costly mistake as prices
rise throughout the year, new drugs are prescribed, or
formularies are varied. Other than complying with the
CMS regulations, plans are not required to disclose
why certain drugs are, or are not, covered, nor in the
majority of cases are the processes of formulary decision-making or benefit design transparent.
This gap between the illusion of fairness and the
reality for Medicare beneficiaries carries over into the
appeals process. Enrollees are given the legal right to
challenge plan design, a right that possibly might counterbalance some of the (potential) problems that can
arise if the patient has a rare condition or encounters
a changing health need during an enrollment period.
Yet, as we have shown, the burden of proof is extremely
high in an exceptions challenge, and the plan has virtually complete discretion to control the terms of the
challenge, the methods used to evaluate the evidence,
and the detailed standard of necessity itself. Even if the
enrollee somehow enters the exceptions process, the
time period for resolving the appeal can take years.46
Thus, in one sense at least, a tradeoff exists between
transparency and opacity, certainty and flexibility.
Part D enrollees may find that CMS rules are inconsistently applied and that formularies change over
time, and that the reasons why particular drugs are,
or are not covered, are obscure. They have the right to
649
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appeal, given sufficient effort and determination to do
so, but with an outcome that is by no means certain.
The complexity and multiple levels of appeal in Part D
thus serve to encourage the belief that no decision is
final – that there is always a further avenue of appeal
– but the tradeoff is a lot of secrecy that precedes it.

The U.S. Trade Agenda and the Australia
U.S. Free Trade Agreement
To the U.S. pharmaceutical industry and its peak
body, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), “fourth hurdle” systems like
the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme represent non-tariff barriers to overseas markets.47 This
view is complemented by rhetoric intended to deflect
criticism over the high prices of medicines in the U.S.
– namely, that countries like Australia that impose
“price controls” are “free-riding” on the R&D investment of U.S.-based companies, gaining access to innovative medicines without contributing substantively
to the costs of their discovery and development.48
In November 2001, WTO Members adopted the
Doha Declaration on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement and Public Health, which said that the TRIPs Agreement
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”49 But within a few months, the U.S.
government had embarked on a bilateral and regional
trade negotiation agenda incorporating TRIPs-plus
intellectual property standards that would appear to
be at odds with the intent of the declaration. The pursuit of higher standards of IP protection for pharmaceuticals, to prolong monopoly prices and delay the
market entry of generic medicines, suggests a willingness to further the interests of an industry sector even
where the consequences might undermine the public
health objectives of trading partners and their efforts
to facilitate access to essential medicines.50
But this is not the only dimension of U.S. efforts
to export its particular value system through the
trade agenda. In 2002, Congress’ Trade Promotion
Authority mandate directed the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) to seek “the elimination of
government measures such as price controls and
reference pricing which deny full market access for
United States products” in markets abroad.51 The
Australia U.S. Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA),
which entered into force in January 2005, was the
United States’ first attempt to test whether a trade
agreement could be used to bind another government with respect to policies for subsidizing prescription medicines for its citizens. A further attempt
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was made in the recent Korea U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) negotiation.
Both the Australian (AUSFTA) and Korean
(KORUS) Agreements contain provisions by which the
U.S. has tried – arguably without success in Australia’s
case – to limit the autonomy of its trading partners in
evaluating, selecting, valuing, and reimbursing medicines on their national formularies, to allow the market a greater role in determining the demand for, and
prices of reimbursed medicines. In Korea’s case, this
followed a controversial 1999 medicine pricing agreement in which the country agreed to set the prices of
new medicines at the average G7 price – all countries
with much higher per capita GDP.52
While it is clearly too soon to determine the effect of
the KORUS provisions on the Korean system, the issue
of whether, and to what extent, the U.S. succeeded in
its objectives is still being debated in Australia, more
than two years after entry into force of the AUSFTA.
The release of the AUSFTA text was met with claims
that the obligations of the Pharmaceuticals Annex of
the Agreement would undermine the fundamental
listing and pricing processes of the PBS, and drive
increases in the prices paid for PBS medicines. However, the specific (and it should be noted, reciprocal)
obligations of the text, in fact refer only to timeliness,
transparency, and consultation in formulary listing
processes, and make no reference to pricing.53
Two issues continue to draw scrutiny. Agreement to
the establishment of an independent review mechanism for the PBS listing process, to be made available
to sponsors of unsuccessful PBS listing applications,
led to claims that this would threaten PBAC’s gatekeeper role and lead to the listing of less cost-effective
medicines at higher prices than would have previously
been the case.54 However, the independent review is
not an appeal mechanism with the capacity to remake
the Committee’s decision to recommend or reject a
listing application; the outcome of any review, which
is limited to a re-evaluation of issues in dispute and
not of the recommendation itself, is a report back to
the PBAC. The PBAC is then required to consider the
reviewer’s findings, and determine whether they warrant a reconsideration of its conclusions in respect to
the issues in dispute, and if so, whether any change
in its views concerning those issues would cause it to
reconsider its original recommendation.55 The review
therefore functions as quality assurance process,
rather than a mechanism of appeal.
The other key area of concern stems from certain
“Agreed Principles” contained in the opening paragraph of the Pharmaceuticals Annex. These state that
the Parties are committed inter alia to “the need to promote timely and affordable access to innovative pharjournal of law, medicine & ethics

Lopert and Rosenbaum

maceuticals… (and) the need to recognize the value of
innovative pharmaceuticals through the operation of
competitive markets or by adopting or maintaining
procedures that appropriately value the objectively
demonstrated therapeutic significance of a pharmaceutical.”56 Despite the fact that the Agreed Principles
are not couched in treaty-level language and confer no
specific obligations on the parties, various commentators have argued that these, together with an obligation to participate in an AUSFTA Medicines Working
Group with the U.S. – an annual bilateral discussion
forum of health and trade officials – would be a mechanism by which the U.S. would continue to pressure
Australia on its PBS listing and pricing policies and
drive increases in the prices of PBS medicines.57 In
fact, the prices of PBS medicines have not risen since
the inception of the AUSFTA and under administrative arrangements introduced in August 2005 to
reduce generics prices, the prices of many still-patented PBS medicines have been reduced through the
flow-on effects of reference pricing.58
Nevertheless, renewed concern has been expressed
since the recent announcement of modifications to the
PBS known as “PBS Reform.”59 On August 1, 2007, the
PBS was separated into two formularies – in simple
terms, separating single and multi-source medicines
– and various levers applied to reduce the prices of
multi-source medicines. Reference-pricing mechanisms will continue to apply to some extent within
each formulary but not between them, and the flow-on
of any price reductions – which would previously have
been applied to any drug considered “equivalent at
the population level” – will be largely limited to drugs
considered either bioequivalent or “interchangeable
at the patient level.”60 Predictably perhaps, it has been
claimed that the changes are evidence that the Australian Government has bowed to pressure from the
U.S. in the AUSFTA Medicines Working Group to dismantle reference pricing.61 This would imply that the
U.S. could succeed – in a forum without any reporting or decision-making role – in convincing the Australian Government to agree to changes to PBS listing
and pricing policies that it had failed to gain agreement to within the treaty negotiations. In reality, the
changes are clearly a domestic response to longstanding concern over the need to find ways to reduce generics prices (as evidenced by the administrative changes
introduced in 2005), and to take advantage of a large
number of major patent expiries to generate savings to
the PBS that may be used to offset some of the costs
of new listings.62 Importantly, while the changes limit
the scope of reference pricing once drugs are subject to
generic competition, they do not alter the application
of therapeutic value-based pricing at the point at which
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a drug is added to the PBS. A new, patented medicine
may still be listed at the price of an appropriate off-patent comparator at the time of listing, if it fails to demonstrate superior efficacy or safety over the older drug.

Conclusion
The U.S. has permitted those political interests steeped
in a market ethos not only to control the domestic
approach to health care financing (with results now
approaching 17 percent of GDP) but also to dominate
the nation’s position with trading partners. The result
has been attempts to undermine other nations’ efforts
to manage the impact of market failure and pursue
population equity. Ironically, this driving emphasis
on “open” markets comes at a time when the administration is promoting the concept of value-driven
health care at home, through a heightened interest in
comparative effectiveness.63 Yet in its bilateral trade
agenda, the U.S. is trying not merely to undermine
the pursuit of value-driven health care by its trading
partners; in essence, it is attempting to remake other
nations’ health systems in its own image.
These actions also suggest that in a global economy,
the political interests that resist government pricing
structures in the U.S. view as equally essential the
elimination of such constraints abroad. Together with
the “free rider” myth – the notion that U.S. prices are
high because other nations benefit from the innovations of an industry without contributing to the costs
of its R&D – these interests stress choice and freedom
from design limits as fundamental values that must be
advanced both here and throughout the world, even
when the price of advancement may be financial jeopardy to the social fairness that other nations value.
Of course, what Americans would think if they
knew how political and economic interests of a powerful industry articulated their “values” cannot really
be known, especially since framing the question itself
introduces the questioner’s underlying values.64 One
way to pose the question might be: should the people
of all nations be able to benefit from the innovation of
the American pharmaceutical industry, and should the
very cost of innovation itself be protected as a matter
of international policy that aims to eliminate “free riders”? However, another approach might be: how much
value is gained by Americans and the world when U.S.
lawmakers pursue the costliest policies under a guise of
rights and fairness for U.S. citizens while characterizing
other nations as “free riders” that attempt to maximize
health outcomes and ensure fairness and equity for
their own? In a world in which transparency of information about public policy has become the exception
rather than the norm, we doubt that the American public will ever be given the opportunity to hear all sides.
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All Australian citizens who are residents, and visitors from countries with which Australia has a Reciprocal Health Care Agreement – currently Italy, New Zealand, Ireland,
Finland, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and the U.K.

Equity, timely access, affordability (both to individuals and the community), universality.

Single-payer funding through federal income tax revenue and Medicare levy.

Centralized, uniform national reimbursement program providing reimbursement to
community pharmacies for costs of dispensing medicines prescribed according to a
national formulary, less applicable co-payment paid by the patient.

Stable coverage throughout year; fixed co-payments according to patient income, no
variation with cost of drug. Absolute limit on annual out-of-pocket expenditure.

Drug cannot be listed on the formulary without positive recommendation expert advisory committee. Strong negotiating power derives from size of PBS market.

Available on private prescription at cost to patient (cost may be partly offset by
optional private health insurance). No individual coverage determinations.

Coverage

Rationale and
emphasis

Financing

Structure of program

Structure of benefit

Negotiating power

Excluded drugs

Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme

Table 1
Comparison of Key Elements of the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
(PBS) and Medicare Part D

Available on private prescription at cost to patient. Patient
may seek individual coverage determination for non-covered
drug.

Limited. Plan may negotiate individually or though a PBM,
but must cover at least two drugs in each USP drug class, all
drugs in protected classes and one drug in each FKDT.

Variable coverage through calendar year. Co-payments and
co-insurance variable with drug and year-to-date expenditure. No cap on annual out-of-pocket expenditure.

Distributed, regional insurance program; voluntary enrolment; multiple private providers; competition-based model.
Coverage determined by providers (within CMS regulations).

Federal income tax revenue (74.5% of premiums); individual
premiums (25.5%).

Choice, market-based competition, individual rights.

Medicare eligible citizens aged 65 and over, disabled, ESRD
patients.

U.S. Medicare Part D Drug Benefit
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Expert committee recommends listing and conditions of access based on assessment
of evidence of comparative effectiveness and cost against therapy most likely to be
replaced in practice. Decision-making at population level; no mechanism for individual
coverage determinations.

Procedural rules, guidelines, detailed information about coverage/non-coverage decisions in public domain. Publicly available formulary includes prices, conditions of listing.

No price control, but cost-effectiveness evaluation indirectly impacts pricing – a more
costly drug cannot be listed unless it offers a meaningful increment in clinical benefit.
Therapeutic reference pricing used extensively.

No appeal on formulary listing decisions; judicial appeal on process of decision-making
under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997. Sponsors of formulary
listing applications may seek independent review of issues in dispute, but not of the
overall listing recommendation. No individual coverage determination, no individual
appeals.

In 2005-06: $1023* concessional (low income beneficiaries); $528* general
beneficiaries.

Formulary
decision-making

Transparency of
process

Pricing

Reviews and appeals

Government expenditure per capita

$1,690** in fiscal year 2006.

Exception request may be made for off-formulary drugs or
to reduce co-payment or co-insurance amount for on-formulary drugs. If denied, may proceed to a 5-level appeal process
– re-determination by the drug plan; reconsideration by the
independent review entity (IRE); hearing before an administrative law judge; Medicare Appeals Council review; and appeal to federal court.

Price negotiated by individual providers or their PBMs. Tier
placement and UM tools are used to influence negotiation,
but capacity to negotiate limited by CMS regulations and USP
Model Guidelines. Prices significantly higher than Medicaid
and VA.

Most providers consider the process to be commercially
confidential; beyond CMS regulations no rationale for coverage or utilization management is required. Formularies are
subject to change.

Individual plan providers establish own P&TC to determine
formularies and access arrangements; formularies are set at
plan level. Formularies adherent to USP Model Guidelines
must be approved by CMS.

Determined by individual providers. Most plans have multiple
tiers with different co-payment and co-insurance levels. Standard benefit in 2007: average monthly premium $27.35, deductible $265, co-insurance 25% up to $2400 pa; 100% up to
out-of-pocket expenditure of $3850 (excl premiums), thereafter 5% co-insurance. No annual out-of-pocket expenditure
cap. Enrollees qualifying for the Part D low-income subsidy
pay reduced premium and cost-sharing amounts.

*Department of Health and Ageing, Canberra, based on exchange rate of USD $1.00 = AUD 1.20694 on May 1, 2007.
** Average benefit per enrollee as reported in 2007 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds.
Available at the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Web site <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2007.pdf>.

Single national positive list. Fixed co-payments according to income, no variation with
cost of drug. $4.06/USD 25.44 per item. Annual out-of-pocket expenditure cap: USD
227.35/USD 1104.78.*

Formulary structure
and cost sharing
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